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STAKEHOLDERS MODEL OF GOVERNANCE  
IN ISLAMIC ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
 
ZAMIR IQBAL 
ABBAS MIRAKHOR* 1 
 
The paper discusses the design of an efficient and optimal corporate governance 
structure of a firm within Islamic economic system. The objective of this paper is to 
identify factors, which will influence corporate governance within an Islamic 
economic system and to examine if corporate governance model will be 
‘shareholder’- or ‘stakeholder’- centered? The paper argues that the governance 
model in Islamic economic system is a stakeholder-oriented model where 
governance structure and process at system and firm level protect rights of 
stakeholders who are exposed to any risk as a result of firm’s activities. Whereas 
conventional system is struggling with finding convincing arguments to justify 
stakeholders’ participation in governance, the foundation of a stakeholder model is 
found in Islam’s principles of property rights, commitment to explicit and implicit 
contractual agreements and implementation of an effective incentive system. The 
paper also discusses the implication of a stakeholder model on depositors, Islamic 




The issue of corporate governance and search for optimal governance structure 
has recently received considerable attention in conventional economic literature 
and public policy debates. This increased attention can be attributed to several 
factors such as (a) the growth of institutional investors, i.e. pension funds, 
insurance companies, mutual funds and highly leveraged institutions, and the role 
institutional investors play in the financial sector especially in major industrial 
                                                 
1*Authors are Senior Financial Officer at the World Bank and Executive Director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively. Views expressed are of the authors and do 
not represent views of the World Bank Group or International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
1 Authors are thankful to the discussants for their comments. Authors would like to remind 
the readers that the objective of the paper is to highlight the sound foundation and relevance 
of stakeholders theory in Islamic economic system and the paper is not intended to make 
any suggestions on the larger design of governance system in Islamic economic system. 
Authors hope that this paper will serve the starting point for much needed research in this 
area. 
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economies; (b) widely articulated concerns and criticism that the contemporary 
monitoring and control of publicly held corporations in Anglo-Saxon countries 
especially UK and USA are seriously defective, leading to sub-optimal economic 
and social development,2 (c) a shift away from traditional ‘shareholder value 
centered’ view of corporate governance in favor of a corporate governance 
structure extended to a wide circle of stakeholders; and (d) impact of increased 
globalization of financial markets, global trend of deregulation of financial sectors, 
and liberalization of institutional investors’ activities which have raised concerns 
over corporate governance.3 Although, each of the above mentioned factors 
provides compelling reasons to examine current corporate governance structures, 
the most challenging, and the one which contains the seeds of a paradigm shift in 
understanding of corporate governance, is the stakeholder-oriented model of 
governance. 
 
This paper examines the arguments for and against the stakeholder model 
presented in conventional literature and argues that a stakeholder-oriented theory of 
corporate governance finds strong roots in the Islamic economic system. Section I 
discusses the stakeholders theory in conventional system and identifies critical 
issues. Sections II and III examine the theoretical framework in support of 
stakeholders theory from Islamic economic system. Section IV discusses the 





STAKEHOLDER MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The concept of corporate governance is diverse and, over the period of time, 
definition of the term ‘corporate governance’ has oscillated between two extremes-
- from a narrow concept of a mechanism of implementing investors’ interest to a 
broad concept advocating protection of all internal and external stakeholders’ 
rights. This wide spectrum of concept stems out of two divergent views: (a) how 
the entity of a ‘firm’ should be perceived in an economic system, and (b) the form 
of the incentive system to protect rights and to preserve the obligations of 
economic agents in the environment in which the firm operates. Whether one views 
the firm as a bundle of assets and liabilities, a legal entity, an economic or social 
organization, a nexus of contracts, or as a combination of these elements, will 
influence the way in which the evolution of conceptualization of corporate 
governance is analyzed.4 
                                                 
2 Kasey, Thompson and Wright (1997). 
3 For a detailed discussion see, Balling, Hennessy and O'Brien (1998) and Bloomestein 
(1998). 
4 Tam (1999). 
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The modern theory of firm dates to Coase’s (1937) fundamental insight that 
firms exists as a substitute for more costly modes of transacting. Transaction costs 
in negotiating, contracting, coordinating, enforcing and discharging rights and 
obligations under a set of contracts can be reduced by creating a firm that serves as 
an intermediary between the consumer and the supplier of inputs.5 Based on 
Coase’s idea of transaction costs as an explanation for the existence of a firm, 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) further refined the idea and viewed the firm through 
agency-cost theory and focused on the cost of monitoring. They considered 
management of the firm to be a ‘continuing process of negotiation of successive 
contracts.’ Jensen and Meckling (1976), developed the notion of the firm as nexus 
of contracts, and argued that contractual designs emerge to minimize transaction 
costs between specialized factors of production. Focus of early researchers was to 
identify ways in which managers could be made responsive to shareholders despite 
the dispersed nature of share ownership. 
 
This basic agency problem suggests a possible definition of corporate 
governance as that which constitutes an efficient monitoring structure solving both 
adverse selection and the moral hazard problems. Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) 
survey of corporate governance is focused on this view of corporate governance 
restricted to the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment. Corporate governance structure, 
focused on investor-manager contract and relation, is often referred to ‘shareholder 
model’ of corporate governance. It can be characterized as a model where (1) 
shareholders ought to have control, (2) managers have a fiduciary duty to serve 
shareholder interests alone, and (3) the objective of the firm ought to be the 
maximization of the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Traditional definition of corporate governance among economist and legal 
scholars, based on agency relationship between the investor and the manager, is 
concerned with the protection of shareholders’ or investors’ interests only. 
Business ethicists have generally considered this result to be ethically unacceptable 
because it unjustifiably neglects the rights of non-shareholder groups. Opponents 
of shareholder-value concept point out that this profit-maximization approach to 
the firm is too narrow a view for an economic analysis of corporate governance 
because of externalities imposed by profit maximization choices on other 
stakeholders. These include, inter alia, constraints on welfare of management and 
workers who have invested their human capital as well as off-work related capital 
(housing, spouse employment, schools, social relationships, etc.) in the 
employment relationship and on suppliers and customers who have also sunk 
investments in the relationship and foregone alternative opportunities, and on 
                                                 
5 Cornell and Shapiro (1987).  
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communities who suffer from the closure of business.6 The exclusion of the 
interests of the others involved in the firm affirms a divisiveness that could well be 
consequentially counter-productive.7 
 
The neo-institutional economists8 argue that the firm’s claimants go beyond 
shareholders and bondholders to include others with whom the firm has any 
explicit and implicit contractual interaction. In this “nexus-of-contracts” view, each 
corporate constituency, including employees, customers, suppliers, and investors, 
provide some asset in return for some gain. Contracts result from bargaining by 
these constituencies over the terms of their compensation as well as the 
institutional arrangements that protect this compensation from post-contractual 
expropriation.9 According to this view, there is nothing unique to corporate 
governance, which simply becomes a more complex version of standard 
contractual governance.10 All stakeholders are regarded as contractors with the 
firm, with their rights determined through bargaining. 
 
Stakeholder theorists reject the three main propositions of the shareholder 
system and argue for the following: (1) all stakeholders have a right to participate 
in corporate decisions that affect them, (2) managers have a fiduciary duty to serve 
the interests of all stakeholder groups, and (3) the objective of the firm ought to be 
the promotion of the interests of all and not only those of shareholders. This view is 
commonly referred to as ‘stakeholders’ model of corporate governance where 
‘stakeholders’ may include customers, suppliers, providers of complementary 
services and products, distributors, and employees. Therefore, this theory holds that 
corporations ought to be managed for the benefit of all who have some stake in the 
firm.11  
 
A critical review of evolving literature dealing with stakeholders reveals that the 
concepts of stakeholder, stakeholder model, stakeholder theory, stakeholder 
management, and stakeholder society are explained and used by various authors in 
very different ways and supported (or critiqued) with diverse and often 
                                                 
6 See Blair (1995), Turnbull (1997) and Tirole (1999) for a discussion of a society centered 
around protecting interests of all stakeholders. 
7 Sen (1993) points out that it is precisely the denial of distinction between shareholders and 
others involved in the firm and the adoption of a more integrated view of the enterprise as 
“a large family,” that has been a major force in the cooperative efficiency that Japanese 
industry has tended to achieve. 
8 Baums, Buxbaum and Hopt (1994). The neo-institutionalists, rely on agency theory to 
define the firm as a “nexus of contracts” and consider agents and transactions 
institutionally, societally, legally, culturally as contingent (incomplete) constructs. 
9 Boatright (2002). 
10 Zingales (1997). 
11 Donaldson and Preston (1995), Freeman (1984), Boatright (2002). 
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contradictory evidence and arguments.12 Trole (1999) suggests that there is little 
formal analysis of the economics of stakeholder model or stakeholder society. 
Stakeholder model is largely normative and is still evolving to find a sound 
theoretical foundation in conventional economic literature. In this process, a 
number of issues have to be addressed. First, it is argued that ‘nexus-of-contracts’ 
view of the firm needs to expand the concepts of contracting and agency beyond 
their narrow use in economics and include their legal and moral uses in order to 
make stakeholders theory of governance a comprehensive one.13 Distinction 
between explicit (or formal) and implicit (or relational or self-enforcing) contracts 
and claims is key concept in understanding the foundation of stakeholder model.14 
When it is difficult to write complete state-contingent contracts—when, for 
example, certain variables are either ex-ante unspecifiable or ex-post unverifiable-- 
people often rely on “unwritten codes of conduct”, that is, on implicit contracts.15 
These may be self-enforcing, in the sense that each party lives up to the other 
party’s (reasonable) expectations from a fear of retaliation and breakdown of 
cooperation.16 This implies that, in addition to obligation on explicit contracts, 
obligations arising out of implicit contracts have to be incorporated into the “nexus 
of contracts” theory with convincing arguments, and that only can be articulated by 
expanding the scope of analysis to include ethics, morals and social order. Hart 
(2001) forcefully argues that many economic transactions are sustained by self-
enforcing (“implicit”) contracts or norms of behavior, such as honesty or trust; 
concepts which so far have proved difficult to formalize in economic theory.  
 
Second issue is how to draw a line of distinction between a stakeholder and a 
non-stakeholder. Existence of a stakeholder entity and its rights are easy to 
recognize, but question still remains who really qualifies as an actual stakeholder? 
Third issue deals with the stakeholders’ right to influence management decision-
making or to participate in governance of the firm. Questions arise why 
stakeholders should be given such right and why managers should have a fiduciary 
duty to protect rights of non-investor or non-owner stakeholders if such 
stakeholders have protected their rights through bargaining in the terms of the 
                                                 
12 Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
13 Boatright (2002). 
14 Jones (1995). Contract between a firm and its bondholders, wage contracts, or product 
warranties are examples of explicit or formal contractual claims that firms issue to non-
investor stakeholders. Concept of implicit contracts is more delicate and refined. Implicit 
contracts between the firm and stakeholders are relatively vague and informal, and no 
documents exist to describe these contracts. 
15 Examples of implicit contracts include a firm's commitment to neighboring community, 
the promise of continuing service to customers, and job security to employees. Another 
example of implicit contracts is between a bank and its major customers that ensure 
provision of credit. Japanese and Korean (as well as other economies) top industrial firms 
were shown to have binding implicit contracts with the banks. 
16 Foss, Lando and Thomsen (1998). 
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contracts. Whereas there appears to be a consensus on identifying the rights of non-
owner stakeholders and an implicit agreement to protect these rights, there is still a 
debate on why such stakeholders should participate in the control and management 
processes of a firm. For example, the notion that property rights are embedded in 
human rights and that restrictions against harmful uses are intrinsic to the property 
rights concept clearly highlights the interests of other non-owner stakeholders but it 
remains unclear which uses of property should be restricted and which persons 
should count as stakeholders. Simply bringing non-owner stakeholders into the 
conception of property rights does not, provide by itself, a justification for 
assigning any specific groups of stakeholders, such as employees and customers, 
managerial responsibilities.17 So far, discussions of stakeholder model have not 
been able to articulate a convincing argument on either theoretical, moral, or legal 
grounds to recognize active role of stakeholders in management and control of a 
firm. 
 
In considering an Islamic view of the role of stakeholders, it is noted that two 
fundamental concepts of Islamic economic system pertaining to property rights and 
contracts govern the economic and social behavior of individuals, society and state. 
These two principles also dictate objective function of economic agents, including 
legal entities like firms. A firm in Islamic economic system can be viewed as 
‘nexus-of-contracts’ whose objective is to minimize transaction cost to maximize 
profits and returns to investors subject to constraints that these objectives do not 
violate property rights of any party whether it interacts with the firm directly or 
indirectly. In pursuit of these goals, firm honors its obligations to explicit and 
implicit contracts without impinging on the social order. This definition 
incorporates stakeholders’ role in its view of the firm and supports recognition and 
protection of their rights. A discussion of Islam’s principles of property rights and 
contracts in Sections II and III provide a foundation for this proposition and also 




PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
The design of governance system in Islam can be best understood in light of 
principles governing the rights of individual, society, and state, the laws governing 
property ownership, and the framework of contracts. Islam’s recognition and 
protection of rights is not limited to human beings only but encompasses all forms 
of life as well as environment. Each element of Allah (S.W.T)’s creation has been 
endowed with certain rights and each is obligated to respect and honor the rights of 
others. These rights are bundled with the responsibilities for which humans are 
                                                 
17 Donaldson and Preston (1995). 
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held accountable.18 Shari[ah offers a comprehensive framework to identify, 
recognize, respect and protect rights of every individual in creation, community, 
society, and the state. Islamic scholars and fuqaha’ have defined and codified 
detailed principles identifying these rights.19 The importance of being conscious 
and mindful of the rights of others (including stakeholders-- human or non-human) 
and the significance of discharging the responsibilities associated with such rights 
are reflected by the following saying of the Prophet (pbuh):20 
 
‘So give to everyone who possesses a right his right. (kull dhi haqin haquhu)’ 
 
The term right (haq) denotes something that can be justly claimed, or the 
interests and claims that people may have been granted by shari[ah. Majority of 
shari[ah scholars and jurists hold that similar to a physical property, rights are also 
property (al mal) because, like physical property which has beneficial uses and is 
possessable, rights have beneficial uses and are regarded as capable of being 
possessed.21 Rules defining the property rights in Islam deal with the rights of 
ownership, acquisition, usage and disposition of the property. Any violation of 
these rules is considered a transgression and leads to disruption in social order. 
 
The notion of ownership in Islam is two-tiered: (i) real and absolute, and (ii) 
delegated and restricted through time-bound possession. The former belongs to 
Allah (S.W.T.) only because He is the ultimate creator while the latter is reserved 
for the man in order that he becomes materially able to perform his duties and 
obligations. Therefore, the first axiom of the property rights in Islam is that Allah 
(S.W.T.)-- the real owner, creator, and benefactor-- reserves the right to prescribe 
for man-- His vicegerent, recipient and possessor-owner-- rules governing the 
property while it is in the temporal possession of man.22 Ownership rights in Islam 
originate from the concept of Khilafah (stewardship) as the Qur’an and Sunnah 
clearly and explicitly state that Allah (S.W.T) is the sole owner of property and that 
                                                 
18 Shari[ah scholars consider that the human self or soul (nafs) has “rights” as well as many 
duties and responsibilities. The basis of this is the fact that when a person violates these 
rights he is said to have “wronged” (zulm) his/her soul (see for example verses 2:231 or 
37:113). 
19 Imam Zayn al-Abidin’s treatise on the rights, Risalat Al-Huquq covers a full spectrum of 
rights in Islam. For example, the right of one’s property (al-mal) is that one takes it only 
from what is lawful and spends it only on what is proper. The right of the associate is that 
one neither misleads him, nor acts dishonestly toward him, nor deceives him. The right of 
the adversary (Khasm) who has a claim against one is that, if his claim is valid, one gives 
witness to it against oneself [Ali ibn al-Husayn (1990)]. 
20 Ali Ibn al-Husayn (1990). 
21 Islam (1999) The term mal or its derivatives have been mentioned in the Qur’an in more 
than 90 verses and in numerous sayings of the Prophet (pbuh).  
22 See Mirakhor (1989) and Ahmad (1995). 
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man as vicegerent of Allah (S.W.T) is merely trustee and custodian.23 This 
relationship implies that man has the right to use and manage his ‘private property’ 
in a manner similar to that of a custodian and trustee. Property is not an end itself, 
but a means to discharge effectively man’s responsibilities as the vicegerent of 
Allah (S.W.T).  
 
The second axiom of property rights in Islam is that this right of possession is a 
collective right and individuals can only earn a priority in the use of these 
resources.24 While a part of these resources are reserved for the exclusive 
possession of the collectivity, the remaining part is allowed to become of 
individual’s without the collectivity losing its initial right of possession to these 
resources. However, when an individual applies his creative labor to these 
resources he gains a right of priority in the use and enjoyment of the resulting 
product, without the rights of others being nullified. Individuals are to use these 
resources with the full understanding that Allah (S.W.T)’s ultimate ownership and 
the collectivity’s prior right, remain intact. This notion is the result of the 
permanence, constant, and invariant ownership of Allah (S.W.T) of all the 
resources, and by implications, that of prior right to these resources by the 
collectivity.25 This proposition becomes a legislative basis for requiring 
preservation of society’s well-being and interests. 
                                                 
23 Allah (S.W.T) explicitly states that “Believe in Allah and His messenger, and spend of 
that whereof He made you trustee.” Qur’an (57:7). By implication, the ownership of 
property (al-mal) is understood to be a trust and is considered to be a test of faith. [Bashir 
(1999)]. 
24 Mirakhor (1995) makes reference to a number of verses to support this axiom. For 
example: 
 
“He it is who has created for you all that is on earth” Qur’an (2:29). 
 Both and refer to collectivity for whom the plurality of resources 
have been created by Allah (S.W.T.). In another verse, Allah (S.W.T) says: 
 
“Do not give your resources that Allah has made you its preservers on to the foolish” 
Qur’an (4:5). 
 Again,  and  indicate the right of collectivity. 
 
25 Mirakhor (1989). Based on the principle of justice, and the recognition of man's natural 
tendencies, rights, and obligations, individuals are allowed to appropriate to themselves the 
products resulting from the combination of their labor and certain of these resources—
without the collectivity losing its original rights either in the resources or the products 
resulting from the individual's creative labor applied to these resources in accordance with 
the rules, specified by the shari[ah. 
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Social interest and the collective dimensions of human life demands that 
individual freedom is kept within certain limits and a balance is created such that 
the individual, the society, and the state each has a claim on property rights in 
respect of the roles assigned to them. Property rights of these three agents should 
not come into conflict with one another, nor should the exercise of those rights by 
any one of these agents jeopardize the exercise of rights by the others.26 If as a 
result of the growth of the society, division of labor, or increasing complexities of 
markets, either the obligation to share is shirked or the rights of the society and the 
cohesion of the community are undermined, or a harmonious social order is at 
stake, the justification is created for the intervention of the legitimate authority to 
take corrective measures. 
 
Second axiom of the property rights implies that while individual’s possession 
of these resources and his share in the outcome is allowed, sanctioned and 
protected by the shari[ah, it is so as long as it does not come into conflict with 
society’s interest and well being. Hence, private initiative and choice are 
recognized, but such recognition is not allowed to subvert the principle of sharing 
or lead to violation of the rights of the society and the state.27 However, once the 
individuals have discharged the duties to the society and the state, in accordance 
with prescribed manner and amount, and are not in violation of the rules of 
shari[ah, their right to their possessions is held inviolate and no one has a right to 
force appropriation (or expropriation) of that person’s property to anyone else.28 
This is further endorsed by hadith stating that “Muslims’ blood, property and 
dignity are protected against each other.”29 
 
Ibn Taimiyah views property as a right granted by shari[ah to utilize an object 
but a right of varying kinds and degrees. Sometimes the right is an extended one so 
that the proprietor can sell or give away the object, lend it or make a gift of it, 
bequeath it or use it for productive purposes; but sometimes the right is incomplete, 
and therefore the proprietor’s rights are limited or restricted.30 Rules concerning 
property acquisition, possession, usage and disposal should be looked at as 
regulations rather than the restrictions.31 Basic conditions to maintain lawful rights 
                                                 
26 Ibn Taimiyah was one of the earliest scholars to recognize and to advocate the rights of 
the society and the state along with the private ownership. Islahi (1988) claims that this 
distinguishing characteristic of his economic views is not found in any of scholastic 
scholars. 
27 Mirakhor (1989). 
28 The Prophet (pbuh), during his last sermon at Arafat declared the inviolability of property 
to be at par with that of life and honor: “Like this day of this month in this territory, sacred 
and inviolable, Allah (S.W.T) has made the life and property and honor of each of you onto 
the other until you meet your Lord.”  
29 Islam, Muhammad (1999). 
30 Islahi (1988). 
31 Bashir (1999). 
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to property are that (1) property should not have been acquired by unlawful means 
(means repugnant to shari[ah), (2) the acquisition and its continuity should not 
result in any damage or harm to others; and (3) the acquisition of property should 
not invalidate any valid claim nor should establish a non-valid one.32 Islam places 
great emphasis on acquiring and maintaining rights to property through lawful 
means but does not impose any limits on the amount of the property owned, i.e. 
imposition of any cap on the amount of wealth an individual can accumulate as 
long as the individual is conforming to the obligations set by shari[ah.33 
 
Islam recognizes two ways in which an individual can obtain rights to property: 
(1) through his own creative labor and/or (2) through transfer--via exchange, 
contract, grants or inheritance-- of property rights from another individual who has 
gained title to the property or asset through his own labor. Property acquired 
through non-permissible and unjustifiable means like gambling (maysir), bribing, 
stealing, cheating, forgery, coercion, or illegal trading does not qualify as ‘al-mal’ 
as defined by shari[ah and therefore is proscribed and forbidden. Consequently, 
any property, which is considered counter-productive or non-beneficial, loses its 
legitimacy and its associated rights. Hoarding with the intention to creating 
artificial scarcity and profiteering is considered unacceptable means of building 
wealth and property. Similarly, property acquired through breach of trust, 
adulteration, non-compliance with weights and measures, or unethical means does 
not satisfy the definition of property (al-mal) and therefore it’s ownership is not 
considered legitimate. 
 
Concomitant with property rights, the shari[ah imposes responsibilities, among 
which are the obligations-- severely incumbent upon the individual-- not to waste, 
destroy, squander, or to use the property for purposes not permitted by the 
shari[ah.34 To do so would be to transgress the limits set on one’s right and an 
encroachment on the rights of the others. The right of the collectivity to the 
property is further protected by the shari[ah through the limitations imposed on the 
right of disposition of the property by the person who has gained priority in the use 
and enjoyment of that property. Hence, while the right of use and enjoyment of the 
property is affirmed by the shari[ah, the exclusive and absolute right of disposition 
                                                 
32 Behishti and Bahonar (1990). 
33 Nabhani (2000). 
34 These rules are supported by various verses in Qur’an as following: 
“And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, not use it as bait 
for the judges, with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of 
(other) people's property.” Qur’an (2:188). 
 “Those who when they spend are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just 
(balance) between those (extremes).” Qur’an (25:67). 
"Behold, the squanderers are, indeed, of the ilk of the satans.…" Qur’an (17:27). 
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of the property is rejected.35 The prohibition of israf and tabdhir (wasting and 
squandering) in all areas applies to property as well. The individual may not make 
an alteration in his property that may harm even his neighbor. If the property owner 
proves his inability to use the property properly (within boundaries defined by 
shari[ah), he forfeits his ownership rights. Under such conditions, the legitimate 
authority is fully justified in withdrawing the rights of usage of that property in 
order to protect it from the misuses by the owner.36 This position of the shari[ah is 
in conformity with the Islamic conception of justice (al-[adl and al-ihsan) and the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual and the community. 
 
Islam’s concept of property rights differs in many aspects from the concept of 
property rights in other economic systems. On one extreme, proponents of market-
based system argue in favor of individual-centered private property rights as 
fundamental right while on the other extreme a small minority believes that private 
property right is fundamentally immoral.37 On the contrary, Islam promotes a 
balance among rights of individuals, society and the state. This concept sharply 
contrasts with the self-centered utility maximizer economic agent idealized in 
neoclassical economics in an unbounded, insatiable, quest for acquisition and 
accumulation.38 Before the full market society came to prevail in the West, a great 
deal of property right in land and other assets was a right to use and enjoy the asset 
but not a right to dispose of it.39 The development of full market society required 
revision of this notion of property since it was considered that the right not to be 
excluded from the use or enjoyment of something that is not marketable. It was 
deemed impossible to reconcile this particular right with a full market economy. 
Hence, of the two earlier kinds of property rights—the right to exclude others and 
the right not to be excluded by others-the second was all but abandoned and the 
conception of property rights was narrowed to cover only the right to exclude 
others. In Islam, however, this right is preserved without in any way diminishing 
                                                 
35 The concept that man has an unrestricted handling authority over his wealth is 
unacceptable. Allah (S.W.T.) has condemned the people of Shua[yb for adopting such an 
attitude. See Qur’an (11:87), [Ahmad (1995)]. 
36 Bashir (1999) argues that Islam attaches great importance on protecting people from 
harm caused by others. The Prophet is reported to have said “to cause harm to others is not 
allowed in Islam.” 
37 Some cultures and religions forbid property rights altogether. Among many of the native 
peoples of North America, the idea that someone could somehow “own” the land was 
unimaginable, while Hutterites practice Christian communism, living together in very 
successful farming communes in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and North Dakota, where all 
material goods are held in common. Milgrom and Roberts (1992). 
38 Mehmet (1997) gives an overview of Ghazalli's economic ideas, which are based on 
private property and ownership, but economic relations are subject to self-imposed 
(voluntary) rules of moderation, honesty, and integrity. However, this view makes Ghazalli 
a non-Hellenic and non-rationalist in standard Western terms.  
39 Mirakhor (1989). 
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the role of the market as resource allocative and an impulse-transmitting 
mechanism. Islam does not endorse the notion of conventional system that a person 
does no harm to members of his group if as a result of his effort he is better off and 
others are no worse off than they would otherwise be. 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion. First, Islam’s 
concept of property rights is different such that the individual has a delegated right 
on the property whose acquisition, usage and disposal are subject to rules including 
the principle of sharing as dictated by shari[ah. Second, whereas Islam strongly 
recognizes individual’s private property rights, these rights are governed by rules 
designed to protect the rights of society and the state. Third, by virtue of the first 
and second axiom of property rights, every individual, group, community, society 
and the state becomes a stakeholder whose rights are granted and preserved by 
shari[ah to promote social order and economic development. Fourth, whereas it is 
difficult to recognize or justify some rights of others in a formal economic theory 
in the conventional system without drawing any reference to ethics and morality, 
such problem does not exist in Islam where everyone’s rights are recognized and 
protected by Law (shari[ah). Finally, inclusion (or exclusion) and recognition (or 
denial) of rights of stakeholders in Islamic economic system are based on 
foundations of rules and laws, which need no justification merely on the grounds of 
morality alone but are derived from principles aimed at creating a just and balance 
in economic and social system. 
 
Whereas shari[ah guarantees some basic property rights to individuals by virtue 
of them being members of the society, rights of a firm or a legal entity like 
corporation are earned and acquired. It is not the firm, which accrues property 
rights but it is the property acquired in course of the firm’s economic activity that 
has property rights and claims. Once a property is earned or acquired by the firm, it 
is subject to the same rules of sharing and prohibition of wasting which apply to 
property of individuals. Firm’s property rights also come with similar claims and 
responsibilities as individuals. This implies that firm is expected to preserve 
property rights of not only local community or society but also of those who have 
participated in the process of acquiring or earning the firm’s property. No action of 
the firm that violates basic set of property rights of those with whom firm interacts 
will be acceptable.  
 
Principles of property rights in Islam clearly justify inclusion of stakeholders 
into decision-making and accountability of an economic agent’s activities. This 
inclusion is based on the principles that (a) collectivity (community, society, state) 
has sharing rights with the property acquired by either individuals or firms, (b) 
exercise of property rights should not lead to any harm or damage to property of 
others (including stakeholders), (c) rights of others are considered as property and 
therefore are subject to rules regarding violation of property rights, and finally (d) 
any property leading to the denial of any valid claim or right would not qualify to 
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CONTRACTS AND GOVERNANCE 
 
The significance of contractual obligations in economic and social relations 
cannot be over-emphasized. The whole fabric of Divine Law is contractual in its 
conceptualization, content, and application. Islam forcefully places all economic 
relations on the firm footing of ‘contracts.’40 It recognizes only one status, i.e. 
moral consciousness and virtue, all other status on any basis is obliterated. The 
very foundation of the shari[ah is covenant between Allah (S.W.T) and man; this 
imposes on man the duty of being faithful to his word. On Allah’s side, the Qur’an 
often states that “Allah will not fail in His promise.”41 On man’s side, his 
commitment to the contractual obligations is considered the best form of honoring 
his acceptance of Allah (S.W.T) as his Lord. 
 
A contract in Islam is a time-bound instrument, which stipulates the obligations 
that each party is expected to fulfill in order to achieve the objective(s) of the 
contract. Contracts are considered binding and their terms are protected by the 
shari[ah, no less securely than the institution of property. The freedom to enter into 
contracts and the obligation to remain faithful to their stipulations has been so 
emphasized in Islam that a characteristic, which distinguishes a Muslim, is 
considered to be his faithfulness to the terms of his contracts. In the shari[ah, the 
concept of justice, faithfulness (called amanah, whose antonym is khiyanah 
meaning betrayal, faithlessness and treachery), reward and punishment are linked 
with the fulfillment of obligations incurred under the stipulation of the contract. 
 
The shari[ah judges the virtue of justice in man not only for his material 
fulfillment of contracts but also by the essential attribute of his forthright intention 
(niyyah) with which he enters into every contract. This intention consists of 
sincerity, truthfulness, and insistence on rigorous and loyal fulfillment of what 
he/she has consented to do (or not to do). This faithfulness to one’s contractual 
obligations is so central to Islamic belief that when the Prophet was asked “who is 
a believer?” He replied that “a believer is a person in whom the people can trust 
their person and possessions.”42 In a very terse, direct and forceful verse, the 
                                                 
40 Relationship between Allah (S.W.T) and human beings initiated as a contract. A 
covenant was made when Allah (S.W.T) asked, “Am I not your Lord?” to which human 
beings replied, “Yes, we testify.” Qur’an (7:172). 
41 See for example Qur’an (30:6). 
42 The Prophet is also reported as having said that “a person without trustworthiness is a 
person without religion.” Mirakhor (1989). 
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Qur’an exhorts “O you who believe, fulfill contracts.”43 So basic is the notion of 
contracts in Islam that every public office is regarded, primarily as a contract and 
agreement, which defines the rights, and obligations of the parties.44 
 
Implication of the emphasis placed on contracts in Islam is that it makes the 
members of the society and economic agents aware of the obligations arising from 
their contractual agreements-- verbal or written, explicit or implicit. In case of 
explicit contracts, parties to the contract clearly stipulate expected behavior and 
duties with respect to the terms of the contract. This contract is to be free of 
information asymmetry; parties intend to comply with the terms of the contract and 
are fully aware of rights and obligations. Importantly, the state ensures 
enforceability of the contract in case of violations by either party. On the other 
hand, implicit contracts are not formal contracts with clearly defined terms but are 
claims and obligations that come with the rights to be part of a society.45 Principles 
of sharing and rights of collectivity to property rights are kind of implicit contracts 
to preserve and protect rights of others and thus establish a wide spectrum of 
implicit obligations.46 Within property rights framework, one has contractual 
obligations to others including the community and the society according to the 
rules of shari[ah, and honoring of this obligation is considered a sacred duty. This 
sacred duty to preserve property rights of others is moral, social and legal 
foundation for recognizing and enforcing obligations to implicit contracts. 
 
Islam’s framework of contracts places equal emphasis on obligations arising 
from both explicit and implicit contracts. This behavior is expected from 
individuals as well as from public and private entities. Therefore, just as it is 
incumbent upon economic agents to honor explicit contracts, it is obligatory on 
them to preserve sanctity of implicit contracts by recognizing and protecting 
property rights of stakeholders, community, society and state. Whereas 
conventional stakeholders’ theory is searching for sound arguments to incorporate 
implicit contracts in the theory of firm, in Islamic economic system rights of and 
obligations to stakeholders are taken for granted. 
 
Islam’s framework of property rights and contracts also establish guidelines 
regarding who can qualify as a stakeholder and if such stakeholder has right to 
                                                 
43 Qur’an (5:1). 
44 Mirakhor (1989). 
45 Since, implicit claims are too nebulous and state contingent to reduce to writing at a 
reasonable cost and therefore they cannot be unbundled and traded independently from the 
goods and services the firm buys and sells. Typically, a firm can default on its implicit 
promises without going bankrupt or liquidation. Cornell and Shapiro (1987). 
46 The notion of accountability in the Hereafter is a major motive to comply with implicit 
contracts. Similarly, the notion of blessing in Hereafter provides a strong incentive to 
comply with implicit contracts.  
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influence the firm’s decision-making and governance. In a very broad sense, any 
group or individuals with whom firm has any explicit or implicit contractual 
obligations qualify as a stakeholder even though firm may have formal contracts 
with them through mutual bargaining. In Islam, a stakeholder is the one whose 
property rights are at stake or at risk due to voluntary or involuntary actions of the 
firm. In case someone’s rights are encroached or threatened as a result of firm’s 
operations, that individual, group, community or society becomes a stakeholder.47 
This risk-based definition of stakeholder is supported by a saying of Prophet that 
“a Muslim is the one from whose hand others are safe.”48  
 
Having established the firm’s responsibility to society and stakeholders, 
question still remains whether stakeholders have the right of participation in 
decision-making. Or, if they are given right to participate, is it practical and 





CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
Once the rights of stakeholders are recognized, one can focus on what 
determines the best institutional arrangements to protect the stakeholders’ rights to 
its true spirit. Or what structure of governance can yield optimal results. Within the 
conventional stakeholder theory, there are opposing arguments with regards to 
stakeholders’ participation in the governance. Some argue that there is greater need 
that a firm should internalize the externalities on the various stakeholders and this 
internalization should be in form of active participation in the process and structure 
of corporate governance.49 Others argue that each stakeholder or constituency is 
free to bargain with a firm and to choose the most effective means for protecting its 
interests. Some stakeholders may derive little benefit from the set of rights 
negotiated by shareholders and therefore would prefer other safeguards for their 
interests. Consumers, for example, instead of seeking a seat on the board of 
directors, or the benefit of fiduciary duties may settle for manufacturers’ 
                                                 
47 Classical definition of stakeholders is given by Freeman (1984) as any group or 
individual who may affect or be affected by the attainment of the firm's goals. Donaldson 
(1995) argues that this definition lacks any normative rationale or criteria for identifying 
who the stakeholders are or for allocating the rights corresponding to each one. Clarkson’s 
(1995) offers a refined view of a stakeholder based on the stakeholder’s exposure to the risk 
(a hazard, a danger, or the possibility of suffering harm or loss) as result of firm’s activities.  
48 Sahih Bukhari, Volume 1, Book 2, Number 10. 
49 Tirole (1999). 
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warranties, consumer and product safety laws, and tort liability system because 
these protections better serve their interests.50 
 
Islamic economic system is a rule-based incentive system; based on the rules of 
shari[ah with the ultimate goal of maintaining a just and harmonious social order. 
Rules are restrictions on what the members may do without upsetting the social 
order on whose existence all members count in deciding on their individual choices 
and actions. Therefore, attachment to and observance of rules will guide the 
members of the society in their actions. The rules themselves are composed of 
those which deal with the individual’s body and his state of consciousness, those 
which govern his relationships with other members of the society, those which 
guide his relationship with the collectivity and finally those which constitute the 
code of conduct necessary for the community as a whole. Rules serve to prevent 
conflicts, reconcile the different purposes of many individuals and facilitate 
cooperation among them. If as a result of growth of the society, division of labor, 
or increasing complexities of markets, either the obligation to contracts or property 
rights are shirked or the rights of the society and the cohesion of the community are 
undermined, justification is created for intervention of the legitimate authority to 
take corrective measures.51 Compliance with them promotes social integration and 
unity and preserves the intended social order. 
 
In Islam, expected behavior of a firm would not be any different from the 
expected behavior of any other member of the society. Since firm itself does not 
have a conscious, behavior of its managers becomes the behavior of the firm and 
their actions are subject to the same high standards of moral and ethical 
commitment expected from a Muslim. In other words, firm’s economic and moral 
behavior is shaped by its managers acting on behalf of the owners and it becomes 
their fiduciary duty to manage the firm as a trust for all the stakeholders and not for 
the owners alone. Consequently, it will be incumbent upon managers to ensure that 
behavior of the firm conforms to the principles and the rules of shari[ah. If there is 
any deviation, institutional arrangement discourages such deviation. In an ideal 
situation where all agents are Mo'meneen, those among Muslims whose behavior 
correspond fully to the requirement of the shari[ah, the faithfulness to the terms of 
contracts and accountability to respect others’ property rights will lead to 
elimination of problems due to asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse 
selection and thus would guarantee optimal governance. In a less perfect world 
where commitment to contracts may be influenced by personal interests at the cost 
of interests of collectivity to induce deviation from the terms of contract, design of 
a governance structure will be required to ensure faithfulness to agent’s contractual 
agreements and protections of everyone’s rights. 
 
                                                 
50 Boatright (2002). 
51 Mirakhor (1989). 
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The design of a corporate governance system in Islamic economic system 
entails implementation of a rule-based incentive system such that the compliance 
with the rules ensures an efficient governance system to preserve social justice and 
order among all members of society.52 This would imply the design of institutions 
and rules that induce or, if needed, compel managers to internalize the welfare of 
all stakeholders. The rights that are claimed for stakeholders are not ends in 
themselves-- which ought to be recognized in any form of economic organization-- 
but means for protecting constituency rights.53 In an Islamic system the observance 
of rules of behavior guarantees internationalization of stakeholder rights (including 
those of the society at large). No other institutional structure would be needed if 
there were complete adherence to Islamic rules. However, to ensure compliance to 
the Islamic rules, there is need for institutional arrangements. Therefore, it would 
be the Islamic government that should specify appropriate corporate governance 
structure, “incorporating all stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary duties of managers” 
of the firm on behalf of none-- investors or stakeholders. So no other institutional 
arrangement that would allow individual non-investor stakeholders to negotiate 
directly with the firm would be necessary. Incorporating all stakeholders’ right into 
fiduciary duties of managers would be counter-productive and would lead to sub-
optimal results. The important point is that each stakeholder is given freedom of 
bargaining to protect its rights and there are systematic institutional arrangements 
in place to provide protection and to mediate where disputes and disagreements 
arise. 
 
Institutional arrangements can be part of system-wide infrastructure surrounding 
the governance structure of the firm. For example, because contracts are invariably 
incomplete, judicial interpretations can fill in the gaps. It is permissible to regard 
employment law, consumer law, tort law, as well as judicial rulings and 
administrative regulations, as part of the contracts that various stakeholders have 
with the firm.54 Similarly, the concept of shari[ah boards is very unique to Islamic 
financial system. A shari[ah board, consisting of fuqaha’ (scholars in shari[ah 
matters) has been used to oversea the operation of a financial institution to ensure 
that the operations and code of conduct of Islamic bank is according to the rules of 
shari[ah. A shari[ah board for every firm, which is seen in present architecture of 
Islamic banking, is not efficient whereas only one set of rules is needed for 
appropriate corporate governance based on the shari[ah for all firms. The same 
idea of shari[ah board can be extended to a system-level board consisting of 
scholars from different disciplines including shari[ah, economics, finance, and 
commercial law, to ensure that rules are defined and enforced so that economic 
agents fully comply with contractual obligations to all the stakeholders.  
                                                 
52 Iqbal and Mirakhor (2001). It is assumed that the social, legal and political environment 
surrounding the economic system is also in compliance with the Islamic rules. 
53 Boatright (2002). 
54 Boatright (2002). 





This paper examines the conventional stakeholder theory of corporate 
governance, which views a firm as a ‘nexus-of-contracts’ with different 
stakeholders and argues that firm’s objective should be to maximize welfare of all 
stakeholders. This theory has yet to offer strong arguments with regards to who is a 
stakeholder and why firm has any obligation to non-owner stakeholders because of 
absence of theoretical foundation to incorporate morals, ethics and trust in the 
economic theory. This paper argues that the principles of property rights and 
contracts in Islam offer theoretical foundations to acknowledge the rights of all 
stakeholders.  
 
Islam’s principles of property rights, contracts, and just social order define the 
business environment where economic agents are morally conscious of protecting 
property rights and contractual obligations to each other whether acting as 
managers, employees, suppliers, customers, or in any other capacity. All 
participants in economic activities, whether individuals, firms, corporations, non-
profit organization or public institutions, are subject to the same degree of 
commitment. Notion of sanctity of contractual obligations is not limited to explicit 
contracts, which are well defined, stipulated and documented, but is equally 
applicable to implicit contracts, which are incomplete in nature. Property rights of 
all contractual parties, i.e. individuals, or local communities, or intangible legal 
entities, or the society are preserved and protected. Keeping in mind that voluntary 
behavior of all economic agents may deviate from the expected behavior, 
implementation of an incentive system according to the guidelines of shari[ah will 
ensure that all economic activities adhere to shari[ah’s principles of property rights 
and contracts so that an optimal social order is achieved. It is not necessary for 
each stakeholder to be a participant in the decision-making as long as their rights 
are protected through sound institutional arrangements. 
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